In the last decade, computer science researchers have been working hard to prevent attacks against the security of information systems. Different adversary models have incarnated the malicious entities against which researchers have defined security properties, identified security vulnerabilities, and engineered security defenses. These adversaries were usually intruders, that is, outsiders trying to break into a system's defenses.
However, security reports clearly reveal that an increasing number of threats come presently from insiders. Insiders are legally authorized individuals who have, or used to have, access to corporate resources. Their illegal activities are not easily distinguishable from the uncommon but legal activities executed by honest corporate users.
To detect insiders' illegal activities is therefore hard, to recover after a security breach by an insider is expensive, and even though insider attacks occur less frequently than outsider, their consequences are far more severe. Insiders can cause significant damages to enterprises, companies, and countries. They can threaten an enterprise's reputation, weaken national and international competitiveness, and compromise a country's overall business.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop countermeasures that are able to evaluate and to contain the risks of unauthorized accesses coming from insiders. Those countermeasures-physical, managerial, and technicalshould construct an integral security management system that is able to protect, internally as well as externally, a company's major information assets. This special issue collects scientific studies and works on security technologies and management systems designed to protect an organization's information systems from corporate intrusions. It aims to be the showcase for researchers who look at state-of-the-art solutions about preventing leakage of organizations' information caused by insiders or by insiders' actions. This special issue consists of one invited contribution and seven carefully selected scientific papers.
The invited paper, Reverse-safe Authentication Protocol for Secure USB Memories, by K. Lee, K. Yim, and E. Spafford, opens the special issue. This paper studies the security of USB memories. These small but capacious storage devices are extremely handy. People use them to carry personal and professional information, including pieces of very sensitive and valuable data. Unfortunately, USB memory devices are easy to steal, and once they are lost or stolen, their valuable content can be hacked.
Although USB data can be encrypted and USB access can require authentication, hackers are able to break into a USB device's protections by reverse-engineering. This invited paper analyzes a large set of attacks against the three most used families of USB authentication protocols: plaintext ID and password, hashed ID and password, and challenge response. It also proposes and comments an innovative authentication protocol whose security overtakes that of existing products.
The first paper, Minimizing Insider Misuse Through Secure Identity Management, by L. Fuchs and G. Pernul, addresses a serious problem in companies' security management: identity chaos. This problem arises when identities and authorization policies are badly managed. In a situation of identity chaos, users have multiple roles and identities, different privileges, obligations, and responsibilities; likewise, user access rights are spread across a variety of security domains. Such a chaotic situation is a fertile humus for insiders who take advantage of mistakenly assigned rights and gain unauthorized access to pieces of information that should be usually off their control. This paper describes a methodology, called Structured and Security Identity Management, that helps gather acrossdomain identity information, remove orphan accounts, cleanse account data, group access rights on the basis of job functions and organizational structure, and suggest user roles that may serve in role-based access controls. This paper's innovative management reduces, or it avoids in the first place, identity chaos, the authors prove.
The next paper, A Comparison of One-class Bag-of-words User Behavior Modeling Techniques for Masquerade Detection, by M. B. Salem and S. J. Solfo, studies masquerade attacks. Masquerade attacks consist of actions apparently coming from a legitimate user, but instead performed by someone impersonating the honest insider. This usually happens after that the insider's digital identity has been stolen. Uncovering a masquerade attack is difficult. It requires to profile user behavior and to detect abnormal patterns indicative of an impersonation. The paper compares the accuracy and the performances of two strategies for profiling user behavior: one-class support vector machines and Hellinger distancebased technique. The experimental evaluation shown in this paper proves that one-class support vector machines suit better operational masquerade detection monitoring systems.
Detecting insider activities, precisely malicious actions by insiders who have gained administrative privileges, is the main topic of Enhancing Directory Virtualization to Detect Insider Activity, by W. Claycomb, D. Shin, and A. Gail-Joon. This work proposes an architecture that, by building a policy-based detection and an analysis framework on top of directory virtualization, helps unveil insider attacks directed against directory services. Directory services are used within an organization to share information about users and computers, as well as to authenticate identities and to provide credential for access control. They are usually targeted by insiders who want to steal sensitive company's data resource. Typical malicious actions upon directory services are the following: creating new users, changing some group's membership, and resetting user passwords. Directory virtualization allows a system-wide overview of multiple data sources. Upon this global view, this paper proposes to build role-based access control policies that describe healthy user accounts in terms of interdependences and relationships with other data sources. Virtualization is also what enables the architecture to seek for unauthorized changes in multidisparate date sources and for violations of system-wide access control policies. This paper intensively evaluates the proposed architecture and discusses related experimental results.
The work Identity Management-based Social Trust Model for Mediating an Information Sharing and a Privacy Enhancement, by K. Mucheol, S. Jiwanand, N. Sanghyun and H. Sangyong, is about a framework for identity management in social networks. More easily than in other digital systems, in online social spaces, people's sharing of information leads to leakage of sensitive data and to violation of privacy. Ideally, the access to resources should be restricted and ruled by policies bound to identities and roles. In social networks, however, individuals have several different identities and roles that change frequently as people join or leave social groups. Thus, the concept of identity needs to be redefined. The framework that this paper proposes is a group-aware identity management that combines relationship-based identity and role-based identity. The relationship-based identity derives from the direct and indirect trust relationships between friends. The role-based identity depends on users' roles in various social interactions. This paper's solution works well even in social networks that suffer of the sparsity problem, that is, in digital communities with little information for one individual to estimate the trustworthiness in the others.
Sometimes, insiders gain access by installing malwares on machines they want to control. A post-mortem analysis, after a malware's strike, can help retrieve information useful to contain the spread of insider intrusions. This is the topic of the paper MalPEFinder: Fast and Retrospective Assessment of Data Breaches in Malware Attacks, by L. Shun-Te and C. Yi-Ming. This paper's work describes MalPEFinder, a tool that retrospectively detects files that have fallen victims of a malware's attack and that assesses the extension of the consequent data breach. The authors have tested it against 52 common malwares, and they prove it to have better performances (i.e., detection and false positive rates) than Splunk, a common malware detection software.
Acting on a wider scale than that of malware's, botnet attacks have wreaked greater havoc worldwide. Botmasters endeavor to subjugate as many PCs as possible to have a fleet of platforms from where to initiate malign actions, such as egg downloading, launching denial-of-service attacks, spamming, spying, and spreading more botnets. The paper Adaptive Learning and Mining Model for Botnet Propagation Early Detection and Size Estimation, by K. Do Hoon, uses multivariate stream data classification with simple text classifiers to monitor port-scanning traffics due to botnets: from that, it generates diverse botnet propagation patterns. String patterns are trained through the hidden Markov model, and botnet's actual activities can be detected by pattern matching, or by analysis of similarities, with the trained scanning patterns. The authors prove that this paper's technique raises early detection rates by more than 30.6% on the total average, with the false positive hovering below 6% and the F-measure over 90%.
The last work, ACT: Towards Unifying the Constructs of Attack and Defense Trees, by R. Arpan, K. Dong Seong, and T. Krisor, focuses on attack/defense models. Those models help quantify security in terms of losses caused by attacks and of gains obtained from enforcing security defenses. The paper describes an innovative model of this kind, called attack countermeasure tree (ACT). It allows to model attacks as well as detection and mitigation mechanisms and to generate attack/defense scenarios. It is also possible to perform qualitative and probabilistic analysis in terms of costs, importance, risks, impacts, and return-on-attack and return-oninvestment indicators. ACT is a non-state-space model: as such, it avoids the state-space explosion problem, which afflicts similar models such as the attack/response trees.
In conclusion, this special issue offers a groundbreaking view of recent advances in ideas and strategies for defending digital systems from insider threats and for reducing the consequent internal data leakage. This special issue offers to its readers both future research directions and viable commercial inspiration for innovative applications.
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